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ABSTRACT 
 
We model educational investment and labor supply in a competitive economy with home 
and market production. Heterogeneous workers are assumed to have different 
productivities both at home and in the workplace. We show that there are increasing 
returns to education at the labor market participation margin, and that these depend 
directly on the elasticity of labor supply with respect to wages. Thus the increasing 
returns to education problem will be most relevant for women or other types with large 
enough home productivity. We estimate a three equation recursive model of working 
hours, wages and years of schooling, and find empirical support for the main predictions 
of the model. 
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  11 Introduction
This paper introduces home production into the competitive labor market model and shows how
this can a®ect educational choice as well as labor supply to the market sector. This approach
provides a richer framework for modeling the returns to education than is usually found in the
literature. We demonstrate that, for some sectors of the population, there are increasing returns
to education even in a competitive labor market. This prediction is borne out by the ¯ndings of
our econometric model, which have important implications for estimation of the true returns to
education.
The traditional Mincer approach estimates how wage rates change with an increase in education
or training (see Ashenfelter and Rouse (1998) and Card (1999) for extensive discussion and surveys
of the returns to education literature). But the Mincer wage e®ect does not describe the full
return to education. For example a degree in chemical engineering is only valuable if the student
subsequently participates in the labor market. The private return to that quali¯cation is zero if the
individual instead uses his/her time in household production.1 Optimal human capital investment
not only depends on Mincer wage e®ects but also on expectations of future labor supply, which
are in turn responsive to expectations of future home productivity.
In this paper we show that there are increasing returns at the labor market participation,
and demonstrate that these depend directly on the elasticity of labor supply with respect to
wages. There are two reasons for the increasing returns result. First, there is the participation
e®ect. Workers with greater workplace skills receive better wage o®ers and so are more likely to
participate in the workplace, and a higher participation probability raises the ex ante expected
marginal return to human capital investment. Second, there is an increasing labor supply e®ect
that arises because more educated workers may ¯nd it worthwhile to work longer hours. This
further increases the marginal return to education.
A central feature of our model is that workers are heterogeneous, having di®erent productivities
both in home production and in the workplace.2 A critical insight is that, when taking labor market
participation choice into account, there may be increasing returns to education that vary across
1In the theory below we assume that higher education does not increase home productivity. However all our
results also carry through if we allow such quali¯cations to increase home productivity, provided that they increase
home productivity less than market productivity.
2Rios-Rull (1993) models skills acquisition in a competitive economy with home and market production. In his
model agents are ex ante homogeneous but become heterogeneous through educational investments.
2workers. For example, workers with low market sector productivity do not participate in the labor
market but instead engage in home production. Consequently they have a zero marginal return to
education ex ante. Since higher productivity workers choose positive labor supply ex post, they
have a positive marginal return to education ex ante, and so the marginal return to education
must be increasing over some range.
In three companion papers we examine how such increasing returns interact with various mar-
ket distortions such as (a) an imperfectly competitive labor market (Booth and Coles, 2005a); (b)
endogenous household formation with matching frictions in the marriage market (Booth and Coles,
2005b); and (c) government tax policy, where increasing returns to education cause large substi-
tution e®ects, and hence large deadweight losses around the non-participant margin (Booth and
Coles, 2006). Our aim in the present paper is threefold. First, we illustrate why we should expect
increasing returns to education. Second, we show that it is women at the non-participation margin
who are most likely to face increasing returns. Third, we identify such e®ects using individual-level
data.
An important theoretical contribution of our paper is that we show that the presence (or
absence) of increasing returns to education is closely related to the elasticity of labor supply with
respect to wages. Speci¯cally we show that the marginal return to education is increasing in
education where the elasticity of labor supply with respect to wages is more than one. Conversely
there are decreasing returns if this elasticity is negative (and it is ambiguous otherwise). As this
labor supply elasticity is sensitive to home productivity, it should not be surprising that di®erent
individuals with di®erent home productivities face di®erent investment margins.
The paper is set out as follows. Section 2 provides some background discussion, while Section
3 sets out the basics of the model. Sections 4 and 5 establish optimal labor supply and optimal
education respectively. Section 6 develops an estimation strategy for investigating whether or not
there are increasing returns to education, and also describes the data source. Section 7 presents
and discusses the empirical estimates. The ¯nal section concludes.
2 Background




U(C;1 ¡ l) subject to pC · M + wl
where U is an increasing concave utility function, C is consumption, l is labor supply, M is non-
labor income, p is the price level, and w the hourly wage rate. Suppose in an earlier period
the worker can invest in education e; and so earn a higher wage in the labor market, given by
w = b w(a;e) where a is the worker's underlying ability. This re°ects the Mincerian human capital




U(C;1 ¡ l) subject to pC · M + b w(a;e)l ¡ ce
where c is the cost of education. Notice that this programming problem is not concave. If the
worker doubles investment e and doubles labor supply l, then market sector earnings b wl more
than double. It is this simple non-convexity which generates increasing returns to education. For
example, a worker who does not participate ex post (i.e. chooses l = 0) has a zero return to
education e (as b w(a;e)l = 0): In contrast a worker who supplies more labor obtains a higher return
to education; that is, the return to education increases as labor supply increases.
There is a large literature estimating how wages increase with education and that identi¯es
@ b w=@e. However, this does not describe the full marginal return to education. Instead when
consumption and labor supply are chosen optimally, the following establishes (using the Envelope






where l¤ is the ex post optimal labor supply rule (given education choice e). As noted above, the
worker who does not participate ex post in the market sector (l¤ = 0) has a zero marginal return
to education, and the marginal return to education increases directly with expected labor supply.
Assuming for simplicity that b w is linearly increasing in e; we show (i) there are always increasing
marginal returns to education at the non-participant margin (where l¤ = 0 and the return to
education is zero); (ii) there are increasing returns to education where the (endogenous) elasticity
4of labor supply with respect to wages exceeds one; and (iii) there are decreasing returns where the
labor supply elasticity is negative.
This simple example illustrates how increasing returns to education can arise even in the canon-
ical textbook model of labor supply. In other words, increasing returns to education are not an
artifact of our modeling approach. In the remainder of the paper we focus on extending this ba-
sic framework by specifying a utility function U(:) consistent with a model of home production,
and allowing for heterogeneity in home productivity b as well as in innate ability a. We wish to
introduce the assumption that di®erent workers have di®erent expected home productivities not
only because it is realistic, although that is clearly an advantage.3 But more importantly, with
this assumption we can demonstrate how the impact of home productivity on optimal educational
choice and market sector labor supply varies across individuals.4
3 The Model
We consider a two period framework where a representative worker is born with ability a and has
expectations of future home productivity b: In the ¯rst period, the worker can invest in e units
of workplace human capital which - consistent with the human capital literature - we refer to as
education. Let ® = ®(a;e) denote the worker's marginal product in the market sector in the second
period and ®(:) is an increasing function. In the second period, home productivity b is realised.
The worker then has a unit time endowment where l 2 [0;1] is time spent working in the labor
market and h = 1 ¡ l is time spent on home activities. Traditionally h might be interpreted as
leisure, but here we think of it as time spent raising children and other domestic activities.5 Of
course some individuals have no children and for them h might be pure leisure. We interpret these
latter types as having relatively low home productivity.
The labor market is competitive. Given productivity ®(:), the competitive wage rate is ®w:
With w > 0; a worker who supplies l hours to the market sector enjoys earnings y = w®l. Note
3High returns to home productivity might be realized by those involved with care of young children or elderly
parents, or for individuals with a taste for leisure or for home renovations, or for those with a strong aversion to
workplace employment.
4Our model has some super¯cial similarities to Acemoglu (1996). In that model, all ¯rms' have constant returns
to scale production functions and an interaction between ex ante human capital investments and bilateral search,
resulting in social increasing returns to average human capital.
5Theoretical contributions to the literature considering the allocation of time to home production - albeit in a
di®erent context to ours - include inter alia Becker (1965), Gronau (1977), and Apps and Rees (1997).
5that doubling second period labor supply l and doubling e implies second period earnings more
than double. Hence there are joint increasing returns to education and labor supply in earnings.
This speci¯cation is crucial to our results.6 An important issue is that ¯rst order conditions
are not su±cient to characterize the optimum. To keep the discussion of second order conditions
manageable, the model used is relatively straightforward.
Assume productivity ® is uni-dimensional, where a worker with ability a who invests in e ¸ 0
units of education has second period workplace productivity ® = a+e: The competitive wage rate
is therefore b w(:) = (a + e)w; and w > 0 describes the Mincerian rate of return to education (i.e.
@ b w=@e = w) and is assumed the same for all. Assume the cost of attaining education level e is
cae where ca > 0 depends on the ability of the worker: For ease of exposition ca is a disutility cost
and represents the pain of studying to pass exams rather than a ¯nancial cost. Further, assume
higher ability types have lower education costs; that is a > a0 implies ca · ca0:7
Young people typically make their human capital investments prior to meeting their future
partners, and before raising families. We therefore assume education choice is made in the ¯rst
period given expectations of second period home productivity. This timing is not critical to the
results - there are increasing returns regardless of whether education and labor supply are chosen
simultaneously or sequentially. This sequencing implies the second period labor supply choice
(choosing l; given e ¯xed) has well-behaved second order properties. But given the optimal labor
supply rule in the second period, we shall characterize conditions which imply increasing returns
to education in the ¯rst period.
Booth and Coles (2005b) consider an equilibrium matching framework where realized home pro-
ductivity is an endogenous outcome, determined as part of an optimal joint labor supply decision.
6An alternative, more abstract, approach might simply posit a gross earnings function yG = y(a;e;l) with con-
stant (or decreasing) returns to e and l: Such a speci¯cation is convenient (second order conditions are automatically
satis¯ed) rather than compelling. Booth and Coles (2005b) consider a related model of partnership, in which part-
time employment is never optimal and workers ex post make a simple labor market participation choice. When
making their ex ante education investments, workers anticipate a participation probability l 2 [0;1] (where future
participation depends on possibly random home and workplace productivities). Expected future earnings are then
lb w(a;e); where b w(a;e) is the market wage rate, and implies joint increasing returns to l and e. Indeed if a worker
has average participation rate l over a working lifetime, then average lifetime earnings are lb w(a;e):
7A more general speci¯cation might instead assume b w(:) is non-linear and that the cost of education e is b ca(e)
where b ca(:) is an increasing and strictly convex function. Such extensions are qualitatively unimportant. Given any
educational investment k, and hence corresponding educational attainment e = b c¡1
a (k); second period gross earnings
yG = lb w(a;b c¡1
a (k)) continue to imply increasing returns to l and k: Assuming b w(:) is linear is a useful simpli¯cation
which implies w can be interpreted as the return to education. Of course linear returns and costs could potentially
imply an individual makes an unboundedly large investment. A strictly concave utility function, however, ensures
this is not optimal.
6Realised home productivity is then random, depending on the matching and fertility outcome.
However, our focus here is on educational choice and labor supply, and we simplify by assuming b
is known in the ¯rst period; that is, agents have perfect foresight. Of course di®erent individuals
might expect di®erent future home productivities.
A useful simplifying assumption is that human capital investment e does not a®ect second
period home productivity b: While restrictive, it is easy to show that this assumption does not
a®ect the qualitative results obtained here.8 As the scope for investment in home productivity
seems signi¯cantly less than the scope for investment in workplace human capital, we therefore
simplify by assuming there is no investment in home productivity, and so take b as exogenous.
Labor market earnings are
y = ®wl
Given income y; the worker consumes C = y=p units of a consumption good, where we normalise
p = 1:
Utility in the second period through consuming C units of the consumption good and enjoying
h units of home production is:
U2(C;h) = u(C) + bx(h)
where u;x are increasing, concave and twice di®erentiable functions. Note that an increase in
parameter b implies a greater marginal return to home production. As in the traditional labor
supply literature we assume x is strictly concave; i.e. there are diminishing marginal returns to
leisure, or home production in this case. It should be noted, however, that assuming labor income
is linear in l and home production is concave in h is a normalisation. If we instead assumed
diminishing marginal returns in the market sector, so that labor earnings y = ®wÁ(l) where Á(:) is
an increasing but strictly concave function, we could simply rede¯ne the model in terms of e®ective
labor units. Speci¯cally we would de¯ne e®ective labor supply as b l = Á(l); earnings would then
8For example, suppose instead we allowed a worker also to make home productivity investments e e and so have
home productivity parameter b = b(a;e e) in the second period. We could then specify a home production function
x(b;h) where h = 1 ¡ l is time spent in home production and x(:) is increasing in b;h. In a perfectly symmetric
framework, we would also have joint increasing returns to e e and h in home production. As is the case in the model,
increasing returns imply workers specialize - a worker either participates mainly in the labour market (choosing
e large and e e small) or mainly in the home (choosing e small and e e large). The underlying insight however is
unchanged: there are large substitution e®ects for some workers. For a given individual, the option to invest in
home productivity makes substitution to home production less costly. Nevertheless for the marginal participant,
the substitution e®ect remains large.
7have the functional form y = ®wb l as assumed above; and home production becomes x(1 ¡Á
¡1(b l))
which is a concave function of b l: Diminishing marginal returns to labor l in the market sector
implies the same underlying 'leisure/labor' trade-o®, but described in e®ective units.9
As the budget constraint implies C = y and the time constraint implies h = 1 ¡ l; the worker
chooses l 2 [0;1] in the second period to solve
max
l2[0;1]
u(®wl) + bx(1 ¡ l): (1)
As this objective function is concave in l; standard ¯rst order conditions are su±cient to describe






u(®wl) + bx(1 ¡ l)
¸
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2(®;:) ¡ ca[® ¡ a]]: (2)
This objective function is not concave in ® due to the increasing returns feature. The next section
considers the worker's optimization problem recursively, starting in the second period.
4 Optimal Labor Supply
We solve the worker's decision problem recursively, starting in the second period. Given second
period productivity parameters (®;b); the worker's optimal second period labor supply choice,
properly denoted l¤(®;b); solves (1): As there may be corner solutions, de¯ne the functions
bPT(®) = ®wu0(0)=x0(1);
bFT(®) = ®wu0(®)=x0(0);
9Though note that, if we have diminishing returns to labor and to education, we could have an earnings function
of the form y = A(a + e)°l± and ° + ± · 1 implies decreasing returns.
8and note that concavity of u and x implies bPT > bFT: Figures 1a and 1b below plot these functions
when u(:) exhibits constant relative risk aversion (CRRA).
As the objective function in (1) is concave, the Kuhn-Tucker ¯rst order conditions fully char-
acterise l¤(:). Claim 1 now describes those conditions.
Claim 1. Optimal Second Period Labor Supply.
Given ®;b ¸ 0; optimality implies:
(i) l¤ = 0 if b > bPT;
(ii) l¤ = 1 if b < bFT;
(iii) otherwise l¤ is described by the ¯rst order condition
bx0(1 ¡ l¤) = ®wu0(®wl¤): (3)
Claim 1 describes the Kuhn-Tucker conditions implied by (1). People with very high home pro-
ductivity, b > bPT; do not participate in the labor market; they choose l¤ = 0: Conversely people
with very low home productivity, b < bFT; participate in full time employment; they choose l¤ = 1.
In the intermediate region where b 2 (bFT;bPT); optimal labor supply implies l¤ 2 (0;1) and (3)
describes the optimal trade-o® between home production and employment in the market sector.
Note that l¤ 2 (0;1) can be interpreted in two ways. One is that it describes part-time employ-
ment, which is common among partnered women with children in many OECD countries (see for
e xample Jaumotte, 2003). Alternatively it can be interpreted as the proportion of time spent in
full-time employment. For example if there are ¯xed commuting costs, part-time employment may
not be e±cient. In that case the worker might instead convexify by spending a proportion of time
l¤ in full-time employment, 1 ¡ l¤ in non-participation and l¤ then describes a worker's average
participation rate. The taxonomy used here is that the interval b 2 (bFT;bPT) is the part-time
region, the region b · bFT is the full time region while b ¸ bPT is the non-participant region.
The optimal education choice e depends on how l¤ varies with productivity parameters (®;b):
Standard comparative statics establish that labor supply l¤ is strictly decreasing in home produc-
tivity in the part-time region (and is constant in the constrained regions). If the worker is risk
neutral, the second period utility function U2 is quasi-linear and labor supply unambiguously in-
creases with ®: Risk aversion is more complicated as there are additional income e®ects. Suppose
9for example a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function, u(C) = C1¡¾=(1¡¾) where
¾ ¸ 0 is the degree of relative risk aversion. Claim 2 describes how l¤ varies with ® in this case.
Claim 2. Optimal Labor Supply with CRRA.
(i) If ¾ < 1 then l¤ is strictly increasing in ® for all b 2 (bFT;bPT): Further bPT;bFT are strictly
increasing in ®:
(ii) if ¾ > 1 then
(a) for low productivities ® < 1=[(¾ ¡ 1)w]; l¤ and bFT are both increasing in ®;
(b) for ® > 1=[(¾ ¡ 1)w]; bFT is decreasing in ®: Further, a bc 2 (bFT;bPT) exists where l¤ is
strictly increasing in ® for b 2 (bc;bPT) and strictly decreasing in ® for b 2 (bFT;bc]:
Proof is in the Appendix.
Figures 1a and 1b depict these two cases. Figure 1a describes the thresholds bPT and bFT for
low levels of risk aversion, ¾ < 1: Claim 2 implies labor supply is always increasing in ®: Further,
® high enough implies the worker takes full time employment l¤ = 1: Figure 1b holds when there
is high risk aversion, ¾ > 1: Note that l¤ is decreasing in ® for ® high enough - high risk aversion
implies the shadow value of consumption becomes very small at high income levels and the worker
instead consumes more 'leisure' (home production). Standard comparative statics establish that
bc, as drawn in Figure 1b, is strictly increasing in ®.
Figures 1a and 1b here.
Given this characterization of l¤ we now consider the optimal education choice in the ¯rst
period.
5 Optimal Education
Claim 1 describes the optimal labor supply rule, l¤(:); in the second period. A worker who invests
to productivity level ® ¸ a in the ¯rst period obtains expected utility
U1(®;:) ´ [u(®wl¤) + bx(1 ¡ l¤)] ¡ ca[® ¡ a]:
This objective function is not concave in ®: A most important object for what follows is
10MR = wl¤u0(C): (4)
where C = ®wl¤: Totally di®erentiating U1 with respect to ®; noting that l¤ is chosen optimally,
the Envelope Theorem implies
dU1
d®
= MR ¡ ca
Hence MR describes the worker's marginal return to education.
First consider the simplest case, that workers are risk neutral and so without further loss of
generality u(C) = C: Then MR = wl¤: Thus the marginal return to education is the Mincer rate
of return multiplied by expected labor supply. Since Claim 2 implies l¤ is increasing in ® (strictly
in the part-time region), MR is an increasing function of ®: That is, risk neutrality guarantees
there are increasing returns to education. The reason is simple - very low ® workers who do not
participate in the labor market have a zero marginal return to workplace capital investment. In
contrast, very high productivity workers who choose l¤ = 1 have the highest return. Increasing
returns then occur as labor supply is increasing in productivity.
The case with strictly risk averse workers is more complicated because the marginal return
to education depends on the marginal utility of consumption. As Figure 1b demonstrates, it
is possible that labor supply decreases with productivity. We shall say that there are strictly
increasing (decreasing) returns to education whenever MR is strictly increasing (decreasing) in ®:
Theorem 1. Returns to education.
For any concave utility function u(:):
(a) there are strictly increasing returns to education when the elasticity of labor supply with






(b) there are decreasing returns to education when the elasticity of labor supply with respect






11Proof is in the Appendix.
Theorem 1 establishes that increasing returns to education depend directly on the elasticity of
labor supply with respect to wages. The underlying insight is that there are only joint increasing
returns to education and labor supply. If for example labor supply were exogenously ¯xed, we
would have decreasing returns to education. Part (a) establishes that a labor supply elasticity
exceeding one is su±cient to imply increasing returns to education.10 In that case, given an
increase in education, the subsequent increase in labor supply further increases the marginal return
to education. Conversely part (b) establishes that, if labor supply does not increase with wages,
then there must be decreasing returns to education.
We now simplify further by assuming a CRRA utility function with ¾ · 1:11 Noting that
b = bPT(®) is linear in ®, we can invert this function and so de¯ne ®PT = (bPT)¡1(b) where
®PT = bx0(1)=[wu0(0)]:
Note that ¾ < 1 and Claim 2 imply b = bFT(®) is a strictly increasing function. Hence its
inverse function is also well-de¯ned. Hence we can de¯ne ®FT = (bFT)¡1(b) and ®FT(.) is also an
increasing function. In Figure 1a, ® = ®PT(b) corresponds to the locus labelled bPT while ®FT(b)
corresponds to the locus labelled bFT: Figure 1a and (4) now imply MR = MR(®;b) where
MR = 0 if ® · ®PT(b) (7)
= wl¤u0(®wl¤) if ® 2 (®PT(b);®FT(b))
= wu0(®w) if ® ¸ ®FT(b):
10There is a large literature estimating male and female own-price elasticities (see for example Pencavel (2002) and
references therein). They are typically small and positive for men, suggesting the increasing returns to education
problem is not relevant for them (they anticipate l¤ = 1 and there are diminishing returns). However the empirical
elasticities are larger for women, for whom increasing returns are more likely to apply. (It has recently been argued
that estimates of intertemporal substitution elasticities are biased towards zero since they are based on the false
assumption of no learning on the job; see for example Imai and Keane (2004). Empirical work estimating own-price
elasticities once on-the-job learning is taken into account ¯nd the elasticities to be much larger. For instance, Imai
and Keane (2004) ¯nd substitution elasticities of over 3.)
11The results are qualitatively identical with ¾ > 1 but the exposition is more complicated as Figure 1b implies
the full-time region may not exist (e.g. when b is large). The properties of MR with ¾ > 1 are identical to the case
¾ 2 (0;1) as drawn in Figure 2; there are zero returns for ® in the non-participation region, increasing marginal
returns in the early part of the part-time region (as returns become strictly positive) and decreasing marginal returns
for large enough ® (as labor supply is then decreasing with productivity - see Figure 1b) but the full-time region
may not exist.
12Figure 2 below graphs MR by productivity ®, given ¾ · 1 and b ¯xed. Note that ® · ®PT(b)
and Claim 1 imply l¤ = 0 and so MR = 0; the marginal return to education is zero in the
non-participant region. Note that ® ¸ ®FT(b) and Claim 1 imply l¤ = 1 and (4) then implies
MR = wu0(®w): Consistent with Theorem 1, note there are strictly diminishing marginal returns
to education in the full time region (where @l¤=@® = 0). In the part-time region ® 2 (®PT;®FT),
MR depends on expected labor supply l¤: There are increasing returns to education for ® around
the non-participant margin, ® = ®PT; because returns become strictly positive at that point.
However, as earnings increase with ®; the marginal utility of consumption decreases. Thus it is
not necessarily the case that MR is increasing over the entire part-time region. Theorem 1(a)
establishes there are increasing returns while the labor supply elasticity exceeds one. For ease of
exposition, we shall assume MR is single peaked in this region. Although MR is continuous in ®
(as labor supply is continuous) its slope is not continuous at the margins ®PT;®FT as @l¤=@® is
constrained equal to zero outside the part-time region.12
Figure 2 here.
Given this characterization of MR(:); we can now describe the optimal education decision of





2(®;b) ¡ ca[® ¡ a]]
where MR ´ @U¤
2=@®: The necessary conditions for optimality imply either a corner solution
(i) ® = a and MR(a;b) · ca;
or an interior optimum
(ii) ® = ®¤(a;b) where MR(®¤;b) = ca:
Assuming MR is single-peaked as drawn in Figure 2 implies there are only two candidate
optima. A local maximum occurs where MR(®;b) = ca on the decreasing portion of the marginal
revenue curve and we let ®¤(a;b) denote that solution. The other candidate maximum is that the
worker chooses zero education where such a choice is optimal only if MR(a;b) · ca.
Consider then workers with ability a and home productivity b satisfying MR(a;b) < ca; e.g.
workers with a < ®PT(b) for whom MR = 0: With increasing returns to education, these workers
12See the Technical Appendix which describes the slope of MR.






If V > 0 the optimal education choice implies ® = ®¤(a;:) as it generates positive value relative
to no education. The converse is implied by V < 0; the worker is better o® choosing no education
® = a: The optimal investment choice therefore depends on the sign of V:
Figure 2 depicts the case when a critical ability ac exists where V (ac;b) = 0: A worker with
ability a = ac and home productivity b is indi®erent between no education and education to
®c = ®¤(ac); where indi®erence requires that the two shaded areas are equal. Note that ac can
only occur on the increasing portion of the marginal revenue curve, and so ac < ®FT: Hence the
marginal investor ac who chooses not to invest to ®¤ will ex-post choose l¤ < 1:
Assuming such a critical ability worker exists, consider V (a;b) for a < ac: Di®erentiation of V
with respect to a implies
@V
@a




As ca is non-increasing in a by assumption and there are increasing marginal returns for a · ac,
this implies @V=@a > 0 for a < ac: As V (ac;:) = 0 we then have V < 0 for a < ac and so these
workers strictly prefer no education: Further we have @V
@a > 0 at a = ac and so V > 0 for a > ac:
Hence we have established the following.
Proposition 1. If an ability ac < ®FT exists where V (ac;b) = 0 then
(i) workers with ability a < ac choose ® = a (no education)
(ii) workers with ability a > ac choose ® = ®¤(a) À a:
Proposition 1 establishes that, with increasing returns to education, investment choices may
be discontinuous in ability. Low ability types with a < ac choose no education and, as ac < ®FT;
these workers either do not participate in the labor market, or only take part-time employment.
Workers with su±ciently high ability however choose investment ®¤ > a and, if ®¤ > ®FT as drawn
in Figure 2, participate ex post in full time employment. Of course it is the switch to full time
employment which makes the ex ante education decision worthwhile.
We refer to workers with abilities satisfying a · ac(b) as home specialists. Such workers do not
14invest in workplace human capital and so have relatively low labor supplies l¤ < 1: Proposition 2
shows how this critical ability depends on home productivity.
Proposition 2. Home specialists.
ac(b) is increasing in b:
Proof is in the Appendix.
Home specialists compare the payo® of choosing no education with investing up to productivity
® = ®¤ À a: An increase in home productivity increases the opportunity cost of working in the
market sector and so lowers the relative return to education. Hence workers with greater home
productivity are more likely to be home specialists.13
6 The Empirical Speci¯cation and the Data
Our theory demonstrated that there are increasing returns to education at the labor market par-
ticipation margin (see Figure 2). Moreover, Theorem 1 showed that the presence (or absence) of
increasing returns to education is directly related to the elasticity of labor supply with respect to
wages. Proposition 1 established that, with increasing returns to education, the optimal education
decision of individuals with abilities a satisfying MR(a;b0) < ca is non-marginal. Speci¯cally an
ability threshold ac exists where lower ability types do not invest in education. Proposition 2
demonstrated that this threshold is increasing in expected home productivity, as that determines
the payo® to non-participation in the market sector. If women have higher expected home pro-
ductivities than men, as many believe, this suggests that increasing returns to education will most
a®ect female educational choices. We next turn to our empirical model of working hours, wages
and years of schooling in order to further investigate increasing returns to education.
We do not test directly for increasing returns to education. That would be akin to testing
whether terms like pC and wl should appear in a budget constraint. In an ideal world we would
identify the investment threshold a = ac(b;W0): Unfortunately ability a; expected future home
productivity b (when young) and (endowed) initial wealth W0 are all unobserved by the econo-
metrician (although to some extent family background variables are likely to pick up some of the
13It is also possible to show that the critical ability level depends on initial endowed wealth Wo: Suppose each
individual faces a budget constraint C = ®wl + Wo:All of the previous results go through unchanged and the
investment margin becomes a = ac(b;Wo), with @ac=@Wo > 0: Richer types are less likely to invest in education
since their endowed wealth allows them to reduce their participation.
15endowed wealth e®ect). Instead we try to identify the marginal return to education and determine
whether this is increasing or decreasing for di®erent individuals.
As men and women typically have - or anticipate having - di®erent responsibilities for child
care, they have di®erent expected home productivities when young. They therefore make di®erent
educational choices when young and have di®erent participation rates in the labor market when
older. For this reason we estimate the returns to education separately by gender. As individuals
with di®erent abilities face di®erent returns to education, we also split the sample into those who
choose low educational investment (that is, those who complete schooling by the age of 18 and
who are likely to have a < ac) and those who choose to carry on in further or higher education
beyond the age of 18. For each subsample, we estimate the following econometric structure. We
also estimate the model on both educational groups combined.
6.1 A Joint Model of Labor Supply, Education and Wages
The theory implies that ex post labor supply is
li = max[0;l¤
i]
where equation (3) implies that, when li > 0; it is given by
l¤
i = l¤(ai;ei;bi;:);
The optimal ex post labor supply choice re°ects productivities in the home and in the workplace,





l + ei°l + "i (8)
with
li = 0 if x0
i¯




l + ei°l + "i > 0
16where xi is a vector of demographic variables including, age, current health status, family structure
(number of children) and the like. Note °l describes the expected impact of education choice on
ex post labor supply (when labor supply is positive). "i captures unobservable factors such as
underlying ability ai:
Individual i makes an education choice before marriage and fertility are realized; that is, ed-
ucation ei depends on expectations of future home productivity and is based on ¯rst period in-
formation. Let mi denote family background variables (such as own sex, parental socio-economic
variables, own birth-order and the like), which an individual knows when young and making edu-
cation investments. Thus ex-ante, each individual i makes an initial education choice
ei = m0
i¯
e + Ái (9)
where Ái denotes the error term capturing ability variables known to the individual but not observed
by the econometrician. The error terms "i and Ái are therefore correlated because of unobserved
ability that a®ects both educational investment and labor supply.
Given ei described by (9), then subsituting out ei in (8) implies optimal labor supply, in reduced






e] + ~ "i (10)
where ~ "i = °lÁi + "i.
Next consider the econometric speci¯cation of the wage function. An individual's market sector
hourly wage remuneration is given by b wi = (ai + ei)w which we model as:
b wi = z0
i¯
w + ei°w + ¹i (11)
and note that °w corresponds to the Mincerian rate of return to education (i.e. °w identi¯es
w). The vector zi consists of independent variables such as the individual's ethnicity and age (as
a proxy for experience). As a competitive labor market implies this wage rate depends only on
productivity parameters, it must be independent of family structure when young. Thus we exclude
variables mi from zi. The error term ¹i (capturing workplace ability as well as random shocks
a®ecting productivity) is also correlated with Ái and "i.
17Again given ei described by (9), substituting out ei implies a reduced form Mincer wage equa-
tion:




e] + ~ ¹i (12)
where ~ ¹i = °wÁi + ¹i.
Thus we obtain a reduced form econometric structure for (ei;li; b wi) which depends on the
underlying explanatory variables mi;xi;zi: Assuming the three error terms ("i;¹i;Ái) follow a











































= N(0; ~ §); (14)















We also take into account the sample selection problem, that when individual i is not working
(li = 0) then individual i's wage rate, denoted wi; is not observed; i.e.,
wi = missing if x0
i¯
l + ei°l + "i · 0
= b wi if x0
i¯
l + ei°l + "i > 0
These equations are estimated jointly using maximum likelihood. Letting f be the joint normal
density function of the three composite error terms, we can write the likelihood contribution of
each individual as
18² if the individual is working, li > 0 and wi > 0;
liki = f(~ "i; ~ ¹i;Ái)








e)), and Ái = ei ¡ m0
i¯
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f(~ "i; ~ ¹i;Ái)d ~ ¹id~ "i
where Ái = ei ¡ m0
i¯
e









where di is an indicator which takes the value one if the individual is working and zero otherwise.
6.2 Data
Our data are from wave 13 of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), conducted in 2003-4.
The BHPS is a nationally representative random-sample survey of private households in Britain.
The survey provides detailed information for individuals on hours worked, earnings, education and
other demographics. In wave 13, additional information was collected about family background and
the childhood home (for example, sibling numbers, birth order, parents' education, and the number
of books at home when the respondent was a child). These variables are used as instruments for the
education equation. Although the BHPS reports each individual's highest educational quali¯cation
and not years of education, we used information about the British education system to calculate the
equivalent years of schooling for each quali¯cation (for details of the British education system, see
the summary in Booth and Kee, 2005). For variable de¯nitions and sample statistics see Appendix
B. Our sample comprises 3839 women and 2665 men aged 25 to 60 years.
In Figure 3A, we plot, for women, the mean hours of work (conditional on participation), labor
force participation and the natural logarithm of hourly wage (workers only) by years of schooling.
19The ¯gure shows that more highly educated women typically earn more, participate more and,
conditional on participation, work a longer working week. Labor force participation is about 50%
for women with only 10 years of education but is about 83% for those with 17 years. Conditional
on participation, women with 10 years of education work on average 28 hours while those with
17 years education work about 37 hours. In Figure 3B, the same information is summarised for
men.14 The average wage of the men who received 17 years of education was about 70% higher
than those who only received 10 years of education. As schooling increases from 10 to 17 years,
participation rates increase from 63% to 88% but hours worked (conditional on participation)
decrease from 45 hours to about 42 hours. Note the selection e®ect tends to bias downwards the
e®ect of education on wages - potentially low paid individuals choose not to work and so their
wage information is missing from the above. Of course, unobserved ability tends to bias upwards
the (Mincer) wage e®ect. The estimation procedure takes into account both this selection e®ect
and unobserved ability.
7 Empirical Results
7.1 Estimates of the Key Parameters
To see whether or not the education e®ects vary with education level, we estimate the model
separately for two groups - more highly educated and less highly educated. The more highly
educated types are those with 14 or more years of education, which typically means investment at
college/university level. The less highly educated are those with fewer than 14 years of education,
and who have typically completed their education by the age of 18. We also estimate the model
for these two educational groups combined. The estimates of the key parameters of interest are
presented as Model A of Table 1A for women and Table 1B for men.
As a sensitivity test, we estimated three additional models progressively imposing restrictions on
the error structures. The key estimates from the restricted models are presented in the lower three
panels of Tables 1A and 1B. The unrestricted results (Model A) summarise the principal results
of the full model reported in Appendix C, and suggest that correlations between the unobservables
14Since only three men received 14 years of education, they are excluded from the graph. The strange blip in
wage rates for women occurs at the same 14 year point.
20play signi¯cant roles. Not surprisingly, the error terms of hours worked and wages are positively
correlated - individuals with higher workplace productivity also work more hours. It is interesting,
however, that for the separate subsamples, the correlations between the error terms of education
with labor supply and with wages are statistically signi¯cant and negative for the less educated
group. This cannot be explained by unobserved ability; individuals with higher (unobserved) ability
will tend to invest in more education and participate more in the labor market, thus yielding a
positive correlation. Instead this negative covariance may be due to unobserved wealth or "class"
e®ects. In the U.K., children from middle class backgrounds are more likely to attend university
than are children from working class backgrounds. The latter instead tend to leave school at the
minimum school-leaving age of 16 years after which a minority might engage in apprenticeships and
the like. Our ML estimates of years of schooling (see Tables C3A and C3B) control for observable
family background characteristics such as parental education levels, but are unable to control for
unobservables that might di®er across di®erent groups or classes in society.15
Model B restricts ¾le=0, Model C restricts ¾le = ¾we = 0; and in Model D no correlations
are allowed. The preferred speci¯cation is Model A. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that,
when correlations are disallowed in Model D, the estimates of the education e®ects on hours and
wages are larger for the more educated group and smaller for the less educated group, in contrast
to the results from Model A. This is not surprising since, according to the unrestricted model,
the correlation between education and hours and wages is negative for the less educated group
and positive for the more highly educated group. When correlations are restricted to zero, these
impacts are attributed to the coe±cients of the corresponding variables.
Table 1A about here
The two main parameters of interest are °l and °w; where °l describes the impact of education
on ex post labor supply, and °w describes the Mincerian rate of wage returns to education. Model
A in Table 1A shows that °w is signi¯cantly positive both for more highly educated women and
for the less educated women. For more highly educated women, the estimated wage return to
15Examples of unobservables likely to a®ect working class children di®erently from middle class children are
heterogeneity in discount rates, a distaste for schooling, social custom factors or simply lack of information about
the potentially high returns to schooling. Notice that the negative covariance also appears for men (see Table 1B).
These wealth or "class" e®ects also potentially explain why wages and education may be negatively correlated,
¾we < 0 : students in continuing education are over-represented by the middle classes. To the extent that ability is
the same across the classes, some lower ability middle class students are continuing in school, while higher ability
children from working class backgrounds are leaving school at 16 years of age.
21education is about 17% per year. For less educated women they are much higher, at about 28%.
When the two groups are combined, the estimate is downwardly biased to about 9%.
Recall that the theory section implies the marginal return to education is:
MR = °wl¤u0(C): (15)




Model A in Table 1A ¯nds that °l is not statistically signi¯cant for more highly educated women but
it is statistically signi¯cant, positive and large for the less educated women, for whom one more year
of education increases average hours worked by about 7 hours. Thus for the less educated women
the slope of MR is °w°l =0.278£7:43=2.067. For the more educated women it is 0.173£0:493 =
0.08. The large labor supply response of less educated women to investment in education implies
they face strong increasing returns to education. In contrast, °l is not statistically signi¯cant from
zero for the more educated women, which suggests constant MR at high levels of education.
We also estimated the three equation recursive system separately for men. The principal results
are reported as Model A in Table 1B (the progressively more restricted models are presented in
the lower panels of the table). Once again, the preferred speci¯cation is Model A, the unrestricted
model. The °w are signi¯cantly positive for both less educated and more highly educated men.
The estimates ¯nd that the response of labor supply to education (°l) is large and positive for
the less educated men, and negative for the highly educated men. Thus the estimates again imply
strong increasing returns to education for the less educated men and decreasing returns for the
more educated men.
Table 1B about here.
Although the main parameters of interest are °l and °w, the reader may also be interested in
seeing the estimated coe±cients for the other explanatory variables included in the ML model.
These are reported in full in Appendix C (the de¯nitions of the variables used are given in Table
B). The estimates of the hours equation are basically in line with the literature. For example,
the number of young children reduces women's labor supply as also does higher non-labor income.
22Higher non-labor income also reduces male labor supply. Better health increases both male and
female labor supply and this e®ect is typically larger for the less educated group. The wage equation
estimates in Table C2A show that the impact of age (proxying experience) on wages di®ers across
the two groups of women - it has a quadratic pattern for the more highly educated group, but not
for the other group. In contrast, for men the impact is the usual quadratic.
The estimated coe±cients of the education equation are presented in Table C3A. Observable
family background strongly a®ects educational attainment. For both educational groups for both
sexes, parental education plays a signi¯cant role. Overall, the e®ects are larger for the less educated
group, especially the impact of maternal education. Growing up in a family in which both biological
parents are not present when the respondent was aged up to 16 years (prntmiss), or in a family
with more siblings, or with fewer books, especially reduces less educated individuals' years of
schooling. However, being ¯rst-born in the family increases years of schooling for more highly
educated women.
7.2 Calculating the Elasticities
How do the empirical estimates for women and men relate to the theoretical restrictions on wage
elasticities derived in Theorem 1? Table 2 gives the sample means - of years of education, hours
of labor, and hourly wage rates - for each of our four groups of interest: women and men with
low and high levels of schooling respectively. The last row of the table shows the wage elasticities
calculated from our estimates. Less educated women - those with fewer than 14 years of schooling
- have an estimated wage elasticity of 1.53.16 Men in the less educated group have an estimated
wage elasticity of 1.21. From Theorem 1(a) it can therefore be seen that less educated women and
men are characterized by increasing returns to education regardless of the assumed curvature on
the utility function u(:):
Now consider more highly educated individuals, those with 14 or more years of schooling. The
last row of Table 2 reveals that women with 14 or more years of education have a wage elasticity
of 0.13, while men in that group have a wage elasticity of -0.31. Thus from Theorem 1(b) more
16The elasticity is calculated as w
l °l;where °l=7.43 (see Panel A in Table 4) and w
l is the ratio of average wages
(6.15) to average hours (29.88). These averages for each group are given in Table 5. This yields an elasticity for the
less educated women of 7.43(6.15/29.88)=1.53. Unfortunately we cannot with our data calculate the longer run
elasticities.
23highly educated men are necessarily characterized by decreasing returns to education.
Table 2 here.
In summary, our ¯ndings for both women and men con¯rm the predictions of the theoretical
model, that the returns to education are increasing for less educated women and men once labor
supply behavior is taken into account. However, for more highly educated men, whose labor supply
is una®ected by years of education, the empirical returns to education are decreasing. For more
highly educated women they appear to be constant.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we modelled educational investment and hours of work in a competitive labor market
in which heterogeneous workers have di®erent productivities, both at home and in the workplace.
We showed that there are increasing returns to education at the participation margin. These arise
for two reasons. First, workers with greater workplace skills receive better wage o®ers and so are
more likely to participate in the workplace, and a higher participation probability raises the ex
ante expected marginal return to human capital investment. Second, there is an increasing labor
supply e®ect that arises because more educated workers may ¯nd it worthwhile to work longer
hours. This further increases the marginal return to education. Those individuals most likely to
be a®ected in this way are those types with large enough home productivity, who may be either
involved in home or black market production, or may be characterized by a strong preference for
other non-market sector activities.
Our model demonstrated how the importance of increasing returns to education varies across
individuals. An important theoretical contribution of our paper is that we show that the presence
(or absence) of increasing returns to education is closely related to the elasticity of labor supply
with respect to wages. Speci¯cally we show that the marginal return to education is increasing in
education where the elasticity of labor supply with respect to wages is more than one. Conversely
there are decreasing returns if this elasticity is negative (and it is ambiguous otherwise). Because
this labor supply elasticity is sensitive to home productivity, it is not surprising that di®erent
individuals with di®erent home productivities face di®erent investment margins. As an illustration,
we estimated a three-equation recursive model of working hours, wages and years of schooling using
24new data for Britain. We found empirical support for the main predictions of the model with regard
to increasing returns to education once labor supply behavior is taken into account.
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Table 1A. Key parameter estimates (Women)
All low edu. high edu.
Model A, unrestricted model
°l 0.787 (1.11) 7.435 (4.04) 0.493 (0.18)
°w 0.091 (7.04) 0.278 (4.44) 0.173 (1.88)
¾2l 289.714 (27.57) 361.405 (13.24) 274.144 (17.94)
¾2w 0.298 (34.42) 0.319 (11.90) 0.363 (19.52)
¾2e 5.124 (19.74) 1.098 (18.29) 0.443 (25.06)
¾lw 3.580 (14.24) 5.473 (7.58) 4.062 (8.91)
¾le 6.039 (3.00) -4.669 (-2.26) 1.835 (1.75)
¾we 0.144 (2.03) -0.167 (-2.37) 0.045 (1.08)
Model B, restricted model, ¾le = 0
°l 1.349 (1.23) 7.495 (12.14) 1.192 (0.48)
°w 0.118 (9.23) 0.242 (4.86) 0.182 (2.00)
¾2l 275.459 (30.71) 375.553 (18.57) 251.715 (23.41)
¾2w 0.308 (38.32) 0.282 (20.90) 0.367 (22.35)
¾2e 5.072 (19.97) 1.151 (16.55) 0.437 (25.62)
¾lw 2.751 (12.64) 4.786 (11.60) 2.839 (8.17)
¾le 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.000
¾we -0.028 (-0.41) -0.050 (-0.87) 0.026 (0.63)
LR test against Model A not rejected rejected rejected
t-values are in the parentheses.
29Table 1A. Key parameter estimates (Women, continued)
Model C, restricted model, ¾le = ¾we = 0
°l 1.502 (1.76) 7.470 (12.58) 0.977 (0.37)
°w 0.125 (9.85) 0.186 (10.98) 0.230 (2.52)
¾2l 272.018 (30.38) 368.190 (18.70) 252.541 (23.41)
¾2w 0.301 (40.99) 0.284 (22.43) 0.366 (23.54)
¾2e 5.160 (19.64) 1.158 (16.61) 0.436 (25.83)
¾lw 2.252 (10.82) 4.497 (10.91) 2.983 (8.76)
¾le 0.000 0.000 0.000
¾we 0.000 0.000 0.000
LR test against Model A rejected rejected rejected
Model D, restricted model,all correlations are zero
°l 1.322 (1.38) 6.142 (12.21) 1.253 (0.49 )
°w 0.133 (9.71) 0.165 (8.41) 0.267 (2.53 )
¾2l 256.120 (29.56) 327.242 (17.92) 240.818 (22.30)
¾2w 0.320 (41.28) 0.333 (22.38) 0.398 (24.15)
¾2e 5.254 (19.32) 1.138 (17.23) 0.442 (24.97)
¾lw 0.000 0.000 0.000
¾le 0.000 0.000 0.000
¾we 0.000 0.000 0.000
LR test against Model A rejected rejected rejected
t-values are in the parentheses.
30Table 1B. Key parameter estimates (Men)
All low edu. high edu.
Model A, unrestricted model
°l 0.119 (0.27) 6.943 (3.30) -1.256 (-0.56)
°w 0.193 (10.71) 0.390 (4.96) 0.466 (4.84)
¾2l 294.771 (29.27) 390.80 (11.27) 267.68 (23.50)
¾2w 0.335 (17.74) 0.372 (7.12) 0.324 (19.09)
¾2e 4.872 (18.17) 1.206 (13.23) 0.399 (18.65)
¾lw 2.352 (7.38) 5.429 (4.72) 3.801 (8.69)
¾le 3.214 (1.47) -6.149 (-2.37) -0.023 (-0.03)
¾we -0.394 (-4.45) -0.291 (-3.06) -0.106 (-2.72)
Model B, restricted model, ¾le = 0
°l 0.970 (5.03) 5.509 (7.06) -2.219 (-3.02)
°w 0.176 (10.76) 0.341 (5.86) 0.499 (5.06)
¾2l 5.708 (173.9) 6.021 (100.9) 5.544 (133.7)
¾2w -1.180 (-25.39) -1.158 (-13.56) -1.013 (-11.73)
¾2e 1.616 (28.37) 0.223 (2.78) -0.921 (-17.39)
¾lw 3.128 (12.44) 4.571 (9.15) 3.476 (9.96)
¾le
¾we -0.298 (-3.61) -0.179 (-2.50) -0.125 (-3.12)
LR test against Model A rejected rejected rejected
t-values are in the parentheses.
31Table 1B. Key parameter estimates(Men, continued)
Model C, restricted model, ¾le = ¾we = 0
°l 0.049 (0.25) 6.922 (8.59) -3.373 (-4.35)
°w 0.118 (17.50) 0.224 (10.26) 0.195 (7.00)
¾2l 5.715 (165.77) 6.068 ( 99.40) 5.590 (131.36)
¾2w -1.212 (-35.72) -1.251 (-22.00) -1.127 (-21.52)
¾2e 1.625 (28.32) 0.243 (2.91) -0.919 (-17.14)
¾lw 2.714 (10.49) 4.726 (9.35) 3.811 (10.37)
¾le 0.000 0.000 0.000
¾we 0.000 0.000 0.000
LR test against Model A rejected rejected rejected
Model D, restricted model,all correlations are zero
°l 0.481 (2.99) 6.035 (9.79) 0.715 (-1.10)
°w 0.135 (18.83) 0.190 (8.06) 0.375 (12.18)
¾2l 5.648 (157.92) 5.931 ( 89.15) 5.511 (129.07)
¾2w -1.163 (-32.42) -1.097 (-16.07) 1.110 (-23.31)
¾2e 1.676 ( 27.49) 0.230 (2.84) 0.883 (-15.05)
¾lw 0.000 0.000 0.000
¾le 0.000 0.000 0.000
¾we 0.000 0.000 0.000
LR test against Model A rejected rejected rejected
t-values are in the parentheses.
Table 2. Hours, wage, and education by education level
Men Women
Low edu High edu Low edu High edu
e 11.30 15.47 11.20 15.44
l 44.23 43.73 29.88 33.57
^ w 7.68 10.76 6.15 8.70
elasticity 1.21 -0.31 1.53 0.13
329 Appendix A
Proof of Claim 2.
The de¯nition of bFT and CRRA implies
bFT = ®(®)¡¾=x0(0):









? 0 as (1 ¡ ¾)® ? 0:





¡bx00 ¡ ®2u00[u0(yPT) + ®l¤u00(yPT)]




? 0 as (1 ¡ ¾)®l¤ ? 0; (16)
where b 2 (bFT;bPT) implies l¤ 2 (0;1):
The statement of the Claim follows from these facts and that l¤ is strictly decreasing in b for
b 2 (bFT;bPT) with l¤ = 1 at b = bFT and l¤ = 0 at b = bPT: bc is de¯ned where (1 ¡ ¾)®l¤ = 0:
Proof of Theorem 1.







:[u0 + ®wl¤u00] + wl¤2u00
¸
(17)
where the utility functions are evaluated at C = ®wl¤: We prove parts (a) and (b) separately.
(a) Note that @l
¤
@® = 0 in the full time and non-participant region and so
@[MR]
@® · 0; i.e. strictly







The bracketed term in (17) is then equivalent to
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As x00 < 0 by assumption, (5) guarantees this term is strictly positive and so MR is strictly
increasing in ® which establishes (a).
(b) As pointed out in (a), @l
¤
@® = 0 in the full time and non-participant region and
@[MR]
@® · 0;
i.e. there are decreasing returns to education. Consider now the part-time region. Using the above
equation for @l
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as ¡x00 > 0: Rearranging this latter expression is equivalent to:
wu0[u0 + 2®wl¤u00]
¡®2w2u00 :
But note that @l
¤
@® · 0 in this region implies implies u0 +®wl¤u00 · 0 and u00 < 0 implies this term
is strictly negative; i.e. there are decreasing returns to education, which completes the proof of
Theorem 1.
















34Now (7) implies @[MR]=@b = 0 outside of the part-time region. In the part-time region ® 2






(7) and ¾ < 1 now imply @[MR]=@b < 0 in the part-time region. Hence it follows that @V=@b < 0
for all a < ®FT: As we have already shown that @V=@a > 0 at a = ac; the de¯nition of ac and the
Implicit Function Theorem now imply ac increases with b0:
3510 Appendix B
Table B. Sample statistics
Women Men
Variables De¯nition mean Std. dev.
marr Married 0.775 0.802
healthgood Good health 0.694 0.730
healthave Average health 0.202 0.182
lote Language other than Eng. 0.007 0.005
white Ethnicity:white people 0.977 0.978
age Age 39.873 8.50 40.173 8.49
chlhh02 No. of children 0{2 0.094 0.30 0.092 0.30
chlhh34 No. of children 3{4 0.114 0.33 0.112 0.33
chlhh511 No. of children 5{11 0.468 0.75 0.371 0.68
chlhh1215 No. of children 12{15 0.288 0.57 0.235 0.52
chlhh1618 No. of children 16{18 0.076 0.28 0.059 0.25
htown home owner 0.141 0.129
htownmort paying o® mortgage 0.630 0.668
regrse Dummy Rest of South-east 0.104 0.108
regsthwt Dummy, South-west 0.048 0.054
regeana Dummy, East Anglia 0.024 0.022
regemid Dummy, East Midlands 0.049 0.061
regnw Dummy, North-west 0.105 0.112
regyorks Dummy, York 0.068 0.057
regrn Dummy, Rest of North 0.024 0.029
regwales Dummy, Wales 0.158 0.158
regscot Dummy, Scotland 0.181 0.185
36Table B (continued). Sample statistics
Women Men
Variables De¯nition mean Std. dev.
prntmiss Not lived with both bio. parents 0.101 0.061
fathmiss father information missing 0.076 0.032
mothmiss Father information missing 0.028 1.181
siblings No. of siblings 2.532 2.12 2.357 1.99
birthorder Birth order 2.236 1.69 0.318 0.47
pacert Father's edu.: certi¯cate 0.147 2.110 1.62
pafcert Father's edu.:post-school qual. 0.254 0.192
pauni Father's edu.: university degree 0.062 0.242
macert mother's edu.: certi¯cate 0.243 0.059
mafcert mother's edu.:post-school qual. 0.153 0.291
mauni mother's edu.: university degree 0.038 0.137
bkssome Some books in house (age 14) 0.343 0.037
bksvfew Few books in house (age 14) 0.248 0.390
kidsubu In a suburban area as a child 0.225 0.320
kidtown In a small town as a child 0.295 0.219
kidrural In a rural area as a child 0.131 0.294
¯rstborn First born 0.305 0.113
yrschool Years of schooling 13.088 2.37 13.479 2.33
lothinc (ln) non-labor income 6.391 1.38 5.680 1.64
Obs. 3839 2665
3711 Appendix C
Table C1A. ML estimates|Hours equation (Women)
All low edu. high edu.
constant 38.676 (3.88) 27.080 (-1.01) 38.785 (0.97)
age 98.202 (1.95) 34.884 (-0.52) 98.219 (1.40)
age2 -162.093 (-2.65) 42.223 (0.52) -162.082 (-1.85)
eng2 -8.153 (-1.83) -4.043 (-0.79) -8.187 (-0.89)
marr 7.546 (10.48) 4.497 (4.22) 7.561 (7.26)
chlhh02 -8.139 (-7.42) -8.975 (-5.19) -8.244 (-5.92)
chlhh34 -7.964 (-7.81) 10.791 (-6.60) -8.243 (-6.29)
chlhh511 -4.831 (-11.00) -4.069 (-5.91) -4.859 (-8.15)
chlhh1215 -1.639 (-2.97) -1.719 (-2.18) -1.264 (-1.61)
chlhh1618 -0.800 (-0.72) -1.759 (-0.99) -0.594 (-0.40)
lothinc -8.536 (-56.68) -7.835 (-36.00) -7.504 (-24.41)
htown 8.654 (8.410 13.201 (8.87) 8.506 (5.54)
htownmort 5.675 (4.93) 10.772 (6.43) 5.748 (3.36)
healthgood 3.130 (3.23) 5.592 (3.88) 2.961 (2.07)
healthaverage 4.910 (6.88) 8.215 (7.87) 4.779 (4.50)
°l 0.787 (1.11) 7.435 (4.04) 0.493 (0.18)
estimates of tHE Covariance matrix
¾2l 289.714 (27.57) 361.405 (13.24) 274.144 (17.94)
¾2w 0.298 (34.42) 0.319 (11.90) 0.363 (19.52)
¾2e 5.124 (19.74) 1.098 (18.29) 0.443 (25.06)
¾lw 3.580 (14.24) 5.473 (7.58) 4.062 (8.91)
¾le 6.039 (3.00) -4.669 (-2.26) 1.835 (1.75)
¾we 0.144 (2.03) -0.167 (-2.37) 0.045 (1.08)
t-values are in the parentheses.
38Table C2A. ML estimates|Wage equation (Women)
All low edu. high edu.
constant -0.634 (-1.74) -2.204 (-2.33) -1.664 (-1.08)
age 5.073 (3.71 ) 2.479 (1.11 ) 4.889 (2.16)
age2 -6.032 (-3.58) -1.868 (-0.69) -6.117 (-2.18)
eng2 -0.138 (-0.77) -0.044 (-0.16) -0.238 (-0.40)
white 0.230 (1.63 ) 0.039 (0.31 ) 0.030 (0.14)
regrse -0.030 (-0.87) -0.010 (-0.18) -0.004 (-0.07)
regsthwt -0.139 (-2.82) -0.057 (-0.80) -0.130 (-1.60)
regeana -0.079 (-1.08) -0.022 (-0.23) -0.128 (-0.91)
regemid -0.083 (-1.62) -0.049 (-0.70) -0.057 (-0.66)
regnw -0.062 (-1.74) -0.030 (-0.56) -0.049 (-0.84)
regyorks -0.043 (-0.92) -0.042 (-0.60) -0.003 (-0.04)
regrn -0.071 (-1.05) 0.057 (0.53 ) -0.142 (-1.22)
regwales -0.103 (-2.94) -0.083 (-1.82) -0.067 (-1.12)
regscot -0.065 (-1.94) -0.104 (-2.20) 0.025 (0.46)
married 0.023 (0.74) 0.045 (0.54) 0.013 (0.89)
°w 0.091 (7.04) 0.278 (4.44) 0.173 (1.88)
t-values are in the parentheses.
39Table C3A. ML estimates|Education equation (Women)
All low edu. high edu.
Education equation
constant 13.258 (23.85) 12.561 (52.80) 15.554 (62.44)
age -2.038 (-3.93) -2.898 (-9.07) 0.166 (0.78)
white 0.811 (1.73) 0.126 (0.74) -0.232 (-1.09)
fathmiss 0.040 (0.25) 0.063 (0.70) -0.177 (-2.07)
mothmiss 0.294 (1.33) -0.008 (-0.06) 0.019 (0.17)
prntmiss -0.115 (-1.28) -0.180 (-2.57) -0.003 (-0.06)
siblings -0.149 (-5.21) -0.064 (-3.51) -0.001 (-0.10)
firstborn 0.124 (1.24) 0.021 (0.31) 0.085 (2.07)
birthorder 0.057 (1.45) 0.008 (0.32) -0.007 (-0.38)
pacert 0.497 (4.15) 0.213 (2.71) 0.122 (2.49)
pafcert 0.330 (3.34) 0.145 (2.31) 0.052 (1.20)
pauni 1.398 (6.25) 0.465 (2.47) 0.366 (5.84)
macert 0.602 (5.77) 0.150 (2.23) -0.009 (-0.21)
mafcert 0.758 (6.02) 0.132 (1.52) 0.024 (0.49)
mauni 1.244 (4.44) 0.345 (1.75) 0.220 (2.95)
bkssome -0.274 (-3.08) -0.159 (-2.73) -0.101 (-2.75)
bksvfew -0.742 (-7.13) -0.294 (-4.46) -0.134 (-2.60)
kidsubu 0.061 (0.59) 0.046 (0.69) 0.057 (1.34)
kidtown -0.330 (-3.47) -0.125 (-2.10) -0.022 (-0.50)
kidrural -0.052 (-0.42) -0.058 (-0.71) -0.056 (-1.09)
function -10883 -4596 -4481.
t-values are in the parentheses.
40Table C1B. ML estimates|Hours equation (Men)
All low edu. high edu.
constant 32.993 (3.00) -26.550 (-0.88) 65.630 (1.74)
age 82.741 (1.86) -24.445 (-0.32) 5.369 (0.09)
age2 -150.746 (-2.75) 64.289 (0.69) -59.975 (-0.79)
eng2 -0.804 (-0.17) -0.431 (-0.05) -0.359 (-0.05)
marr 10.246 (10.34) 5.516 (3.59) 8.467 (6.79)
chlhh02 -3.172 (-2.26) 0.239 (0.10) -8.479 (-5.36)
chlhh34 0.621 (0.54) -0.286 (-0.16) 2.241 (1.47)
chlhh511 -1.616 (-2.80) -0.387 (-0.42) -1.006 (-1.35)
chlhh1215 -0.811 (-1.15) 0.704 (0.62) -1.171 (-1.30)
chlhh1618 1.947 (1.32) 1.484 (0.62) -0.127 (-0.08)
lothinc -5.556 (-51.77) -7.847 (-30.31) -3.652 (-34.70)
htown 9.145 (7.81) 16.457 (8.64) 10.827 (7.03)
htownmort 5.281 (4.10) 9.603 (4.65) 12.436 (7.06)
healthgood 10.999 (9.60) 4.539 (2.50) 4.693 (3.04)
healthaverage 11.274 (12.94) 10.237 (7.31) 4.241 (3.68)
°l 0.119 (0.27) 6.943 (3.30) -1.256 (-0.56)
estimates of the Covariance matrix
¾2l 294.771 (29.27) 294.771 (29.27) 294.771 (29.27)
¾2w 0.335 (17.74) 0.335 (17.74) 0.335 (17.74)
¾2e 4.872 (18.17) 4.872 (18.17) 4.872 (18.17)
¾lw 2.352 (7.38) 5.429 (4.72) 3.801 (8.69)
¾le 3.214 (1.47) -6.149 (-2.37) -0.023 (-0.03)
¾we -0.394 (-4.45) -0.291 (-3.06) -0.106 (-2.72)
t-values are in the parentheses.
41Table C2B. ML estimates|Wage equation (Men)
All low edu. high edu.
constant -2.858 (-6.28) -4.407 (-3.77) -6.372 (-3.96)
age 11.409 (6.91) 9.006 (3.40) 6.324 (2.85)
age2 -13.557 (-6.72) -9.717 (-3.08) -7.488 (-2.74)
lote -0.438 (-2.58) -0.024 (-0.02) -0.754 (-2.47)
white 0.059 (0.61) -0.097 (-0.43) 0.148 (1.30)
regrse -0.027 (-0.59) 0.109 (1.46) -0.037 (-0.66)
regsthwt -0.073 (-1.30) 0.097 (1.13) -0.159 (-2.14)
regeana 0.044 (0.40) -0.033 (-0.23) 0.064 (0.46)
regemid -0.102 (-1.64) -0.060 (-0.70) -0.093 (-1.07)
regnw -0.133 (-2.84) -0.074 (-1.06) -0.084 (-1.40)
regyorks -0.078 (-1.21) -0.021 (-0.22) -0.080 (-0.97)
regrn -0.145 (-1.77) -0.129 (-1.00) -0.146 (-1.47)
regwales -0.129 (-2.93) -0.066 (-1.05) -0.138 (-2.38)
regscot -0.170 (-4.17) -0.123 (-2.07) -0.134 (-2.51)
married 0.134 (5.39) 0.204 (3.64) 0.082 (2.99)
°w 0.193 (10.71) 0.390 (4.96) 0.466 (4.84)
t-values are in the parentheses.
42Table C3B. ML estimates|Education equation (Men)
All low edu. high edu.
constant 14.353 (32.67) 11.749 (29.79) 15.617 (97.63)
age 0.507 (0.87) -1.836 (-4.19) 0.729 (3.28)
white -0.980 (-3.30) 0.435 (1.41) -0.325 (-3.15)
fathmiss -0.239 (-1.25) -0.089 (-0.57) 0.047 (0.55)
mothmiss -0.309 (-1.20) -0.089 (-0.51) 0.008 (0.07)
prntmiss -0.232 (-1.85) -0.217 (-2.38) -0.124 (-2.25)
siblings -0.219 (-6.34) -0.073 (-2.76) -0.047 (-2.78)
firstborn 0.222 (1.96) 0.009 (0.11) 0.070 (1.60)
birthorder 0.079 (1.70) -0.001 (-0.04) 0.009 (0.40)
pacert 0.225 (1.73) 0.059 (0.61) -0.024 (-0.50)
pafcert 0.328 (2.69) 0.192 (2.11) -0.083 (-1.74)
pauni 1.367 (5.05) 0.298 (1.25) 0.259 (3.63)
macert 0.586 (4.94) 0.341 (3.88) 0.130 (3.04)
mafcert 0.670 (4.36) 0.309 (2.55) 0.203 (3.73)
mauni 1.037 (3.20) 0.627 (2.02) 0.315 (3.68)
bkssome -0.207 (-1.87) 0.051 (0.59) -0.097 (-2.46)
bksvfew -0.404 (-3.41) 0.015 (0.17) -0.095 (-2.05)
kidsubu 0.404 (3.39) 0.033 (0.36) 0.142 (3.16)
kidtown 0.272 (2.50) 0.019 (0.24) 0.052 (1.21)
kidrural -0.062 (-0.41) 0.054 (0.52) 0.004 (0.06)
function -8444 -3281 -3822
t-values are in the parentheses.
43